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Abstract
This paper studies the cost requirement for two-agent collusion-proof mechanism design.
Unlike the existing results for general environments with three or more agents, it is shown that
collusive behavior cannot be prevented freely in two-agent nonlinear pricing environments
with correlated types. Reporting manipulation calls for distortions away from the rst-best
eciency, and arbitrage calls for further distortion. Moreover, we show that the distortionary
patterns are quite dierent for positive and negative correlations. The second-best outcome
is attainable as negative correlation is vanishing, while the limit of collusion-proof eciency
is strictly lower than the second-best level as positive correlation goes to zero. Allowing
arbitrage therefore breaks the continuity between correlated and uncorrelated types.
Keywords: Nonlinear pricing, collusion-proof, mechanism design, arbitrage, correlation
JEL Classication Number : D42, D62, D82
1 Introduction
The traditional principal-multiagent model assumes away collusion among agents, that is,
they behave in a non-cooperative way. For economic environments with independent types,
the classical result of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) show that there is in general no rst-
best outcome and only second-best outcome is achievable. But, when risk-neutral agents have
correlated types and are not protected by limited liability, Cremer and McLean (hereafter CM)
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(1985, 1988) show that the principal can obtain the rst-best allocation by cross-checking the
agents' reports against each other and fully extracting their information rents in absence of
collusion. This full surplus extraction (FSE) result holds for any degree of correlation, even if
it approaches zero. However, when correlation is actually zero, the cross-checking method does
not work, so only the second-best allocation is achievable, a conventional result for independent
types. Therefore, a notable discontinuity occurs at zero correlation point. Another drawback of
CM's FSE mechanism is its vulnerability to collusion. If the agents can coordinate their reports,
it may be impossible for the principal to induce information revelation via cross-checking at no
cost.
However, no collusion is a rather unrealistic assumption unless the principal can impose
suciently large transaction costs on side-contracting so that agents are not able to collude
at all. In reality, however, collusion is a widespread and noxious phenomenon. Agents often
collude to increase their aggregate payos at the expense of the principal. This phenomenon is
an important concern in mechanism design theory. Typically, collusion imposes severe limits on
what can be achieved, and thus it is generally regarded as a factor that reduces the principal's
payo in addition to the asymmetric information.
The pioneering work that studies collusion in principal-multiagent setting is due to Laont
and Mortimort (hereafter LM) (1997, 2000). They oer a tractable modeling framework for
analyzing the role of colluders' information asymmetry in collusion-proof mechanism design. A
stark dierence is found for independent types and correlated types. In procurement/public
good settings with two agents, they show that the optimal outcome can be made collusion-proof
at no cost to the principal if the agents' types are uncorrelated (LM, 1997), but if the types are
correlated, preventing collusion entails strict cost to the principal (LM, 2000). Furthermore, the
nature of the optimal incentive scheme changes continuously as correlation goes to zero. That is,
allowing collusion restores continuity between the correlated and the uncorrelated environments.
In LM's procurement/public good settings, two agents may consume certain amount of goods
in a non-excludable way. As such, there is no need and it is technologically impossible to split
the goods between them. However, in private-goods setting, say, in monopoly pricing problem,
buyers have incentive to reallocate their total purchases obtained from the principal. Thus, the
mechanism designer should make optimal contractual response preventing the agents from (i)
manipulating their reports, (ii) exchanging side transfers and (iii) conducting arbitrage.1 Jeon
1More recently, a number of contributions, noticeably Mookherjee and Tsumagari (2004), Dequiedt (2007) and
Pavlov (2008) among others, have noted that agents can coordinate not only on the way they play the grand
mechanism, but also on their participation decisions.
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and Menicucci (hereafter JM) (2005) extend LM's model by incorporating arbitrage. They show
that collusion is preventable at no cost with uncorrelated types in a nonlinear pricing model that
allows collusive consumers to arbitrage on their purchases. They do not, however, consider a
more interesting case where agents' types may be correlated.
Che and Kim (hereafter CK) (2006) advance on these fronts by developing a general method
for collusion-proong a mechanism. They show that agents' collusion, including both reporting
manipulation and arbitrage, is harmless to the principal, i.e., agents' collusion imposes no cost
in a broad class of circumstances with more than two agents (n > 3) for correlated types and
more than one agent (n > 2) for uncorrelated types.2 This no-cost result is sharply dierent
from Laont and Mortimort (2000)'s result that preventing collusion entails strict cost to the
principal when the types are correlated. Any payo the principal can attain in the absence
of collusion, including the second-best eciency is attainable with uncorrelated types, and the
rst-best eciency is also attainable with correlated types. More importantly, CK's result on
collusion-proof implementation at no cost is rather robust for general economic environments.
It does not rest on any special assumptions about preferences/technologies or type structures,
nor on collusive behavior.
However, while Che and Kim give a full answer in a broad class of environments when
types are uncorrelated, they leave the two-agent correlated-type case unanswered. It is still
unknown how far these transaction costs can be exploited in contract design for general two-
agent economic environments when types are correlated. The two-agent case is important in the
theory of mechanism design, since a variety of economic phenomena are basically bilateral. As
Moore and Repullo (1990) have emphasized, two-agent model is the leading case for applications
to contracting or bargaining. The results for two-agent design problem may, and in fact, as shown
in the paper, be very dierent from its multi-agent counterpart. As such, this case needs to be
considered separately.3
In this paper, we show that the result that agents' asymmetric information imposes no
additional transaction costs on their abilities to carry out collusive arrangements for economies
2An additional requirement is that at least one agent has more than two types if n = 3 for correlated types.
3Notable examples are those in the literature on Nash implementation. It is well known that when n > 3, if
a SCR satises monotonicity and no-veto power, it is Nash implementable. These conditions are, however, not
sucient for Nash implementability of two-person SCR. (See Maskin (1999), Moore and Repullo (1990), Dutta
and Sen (1991), Denilov (1992), Sjostrom (1991) among many others for detailed discussion.) Contrary to the case
of three or more agents, it is generally impossible to Nash implement Walrasian or Lindahl correspondences with
smooth and balanced mechanism in the case of two agents. (See Hurwicz and Weinberger (1984), Reichelstein
(1984), Nakamura (1987), Kwan and Nakamura (1987) for detailed discussion.)
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with three or more agents is no longer true for economies that include nonlinear-pricing/priviate-
goods economic environments with correlation and arbitrage. Preventing collusion entails strict
cost to the principal when there are only two agents and their types are correlated.
Our results depart from the existing literature as follows. First, our two-agent result comple-
ments CK's work and gives a full answer to the question whether collusion with both reporting
manipulation and arbitrage is preventable at no cost. Che and Kim (2006) show that the prin-
cipal can always ght o collusion for economies with three or more agents at no cost using a
robustly collusion-proof grand mechanism. In contrast, our nding is that preventing collusion
entails strict cost to the principal for two-agent economies with correlation. This is consistent
with Olson's famous argument that small groups are more able to act in their common interest
than large ones because they face lower per capita transaction costs when attempting to organize
for collective action [Olson (1965)].4
Secondly, we extend the result of LM (2000) by considering both arbitrage and negative
correlation. LM (2000) give the collusion-proof mechanism in procurement/public good envi-
ronments. It is unnecessary and impossible to split the goods between consumers. In contrast,
we discuss the private good problem. Consumers could conduct arbitrage on their total pur-
chases. We nd that the possibility of arbitrage may call for further distortions away from the
eciency obtained in arbitrage-free case { i.e., preventing collusion may entail an even higher
cost to the principal in two-agent nonlinear pricing setting with correlated types and arbitrage.
Moreover, LM (2000)'s model considers only positive correlation, while we consider negative
correlation as well. In our analysis, the heterogeneous transaction costs endogenously imposed
by the principal on side contracting play an important role in determining the optimal mechanis-
m. We nd that, in the presence of arbitrage, asymmetric information between agents does not
generate any transaction cost in the weak positive correlation case while it generates transaction
costs in weak negative correlation case. This leads to a striking discontinuity of collusion-proof
mechanism at zero correlation.
Lastly, we also extend the main conclusion of JM (2005). They consider information ma-
nipulation and arbitrage with only uncorrelated types. In contrast, we consider both positive,
negative and zero correlations. JM's result is therefore a special case of ours.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the economic environments
studied. Section 3 reviews as a benchmark the optimal pricing mechanism without collusion. Sec-
tion 4 characterizes the coalitional incentive and no-arbitrage constraints that must be satised
4This argument is often used to explain why taxpayers often do not form an interest group while managers of
an industry do.
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by a weakly collusion-proof mechanism. Section 5 describes the optimal weakly collusion-proof
mechanism with reporting manipulation alone. Section 6 discusses the case with both reporting
manipulation and arbitrage. Section 7 gives conclusions.
2 The Model
2.1 Preferences, Information, and Mechanisms
A monopolist seller can produce any amount of a homogeneous good at constant marginal
cost c and sells it to two buyers whose consumptions are qi; i 2 f1; 2g. Buyer i obtains utility
iV (qi)   ti from consuming qi units of goods and paying ti units of money to the seller. V ()
is an increasing concave function with V 0() > 0 and V 00() < 0. The consumer privately
observes his own type i 2   fL; Hg, where   H   L. The probabilities p(1; 2) of
each state (1; 2) 2 2, are common knowledge prior beliefs. For simplicity, we write pLL =
p(L; L); pLH = p(L; H) = p(H ; L); pHH = p(H ; H): We also denote by   pLLpHH   p2LH
the degree of correlation between the agents' types.
The monopolist seller designs a grand sale mechanism M to maximize her expected prot.
Considering the Revelation Principle, we can restrict our attention to direct revelation mech-
anism which maps any pair of reported types ( b1; b2) into a combination of consumptions and
payments:
M =
n
q1( b1; b2); q2( b1; b2); t1( b1; b2); t2( b1; b2)o ; 8( b1; b2) 2 2:
Since buyers are ex ante identical, without loss of generality, we focus on anonymous mechanism
in which the consumption and payment of a buyer depend only on the reports and not on his
identity. Then we denote by tkl for k; l 2 fH;Lg the tax paid by an agent whose report is k and
the other agent's report is l, and qkl is dened analogously. Let q = (qLL; qLH ; qHL; qHH) 2 R4+
and t = (tLL; tLH ; tHL; tHH) 2 R4 denote the vectors of quantities and transfers respectively.
2.2 Coalition Formation
Applying the methodology of LM (1997, 2000), we model the buyers' coalition formation
by a side-contract, denoted by S, oered by a benevolent uninformed third party. The third
party organizes the buyers into collusion in order to maximize the sum of their payos subject
to incentive compatibility and participation constraints written with respect to the utility a
buyer obtains when the grand mechanism M is played non-cooperatively. We study a collusive
arrangement that allows the agents (i) to collectively manipulate their reports to the principal
5
and exchange transfers in a budget-balanced way, (ii) to reallocate quantities assigned by the
grand contract. The timing of the overall game of contract oer and coalition formation is the
following:
 Stage 1: Buyers learn their respective \types".
 Stage 2: The seller proposes a grand sale mechanism M. If any buyer vetoes the grand
mechanism, all buyers get their reservation utility normalized exogenously at zero and the
following stages do not occur.
 Stage 3: The third party proposes a side mechanism S to the buyers. If anyone refuses
this side mechanism, M is played non-cooperatively. If both buyers accept S, they report
their types to the third party who enforces manipulation of report into M, and commits
to enforce the corresponding side transfers and reallocation within coalition.
 Stage 4: Reports are sent into the grand mechanism. Quantities and payments specied
in M are enforced. Quantities reallocation and side transfers specied in S, if any, are
implemented.
Formally, a side mechanism S takes the following form:
S =
n
( e1; e2); x1( e1; e2; ); x2( e1; e2; ); y1( e1; e2); y2( e1; e2)o ; 8( e1; e2) 2 2:
ei is buyer i's report to the third party. () is the manipulated report to the grand mechanism.
yi( e1; e2) denotes the monetary transfer from buyer i to the third party. xi( e1; e2; ) represents
the quantity of goods buyer i receives from the third party when  is reported to the seller and
( e1; e2) are reported to the third party. Such a reallocation rule maximizes the joint surplus of
the buyers subject to the total amount of the goods being allocated to all consumers. Since the
third party is neither a source of goods nor money, we assume that a side mechanism should
satisfy the ex post budget-balance constraints for the reallocation of goods and for the side
transfers, respectively
2X
i=1
xi( e1; e2; ) = 0 and 2X
i=1
yi( e1; e2) = 0; 8( e1; e1) 2 2 and 8 2 2:
Let UM (i) denote the expected payo of a i type in truthful equilibrium of M. The side
mechanism must guarantee to an agent a utility level greater than what he expects from playing
non-cooperatively the grand mechanism and then getting a utility UM (i).
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3 The Optimal Grand-Mechanism without Coalition
Firstly, we study, as a benchmark, the optimal grand-mechanism without side-contracting
with correlated types, i.e.,  6= 0. The seller's expected prot is
(t;q)  2pLL (tLL   cqLL) + 2pLH (tLH + tHL   cqLH   cqHL) + 2pHH (tHH   cqHH) :
The following Bayesian incentive-compatibility constraints should be satised. For a L type
buyer
BICL : pLL [LV (qLL)  tLL] + pLH [LV (qLH)  tLH ]
>pLL[LV (qHL)  tHL] + pLH [LV (qHH)  tHH ];
(1)
for a H type buyer
BICH : pLH [HV (qHL)  tHL] + pHH [HV (qHH)  tHH ]
>pLH [HV (qLL)  tLL] + pHH [HV (qLH)  tLH ]:
(2)
The mechanism should also satisfy the following interim individual-rationality constraints. For
a L and H type, respectively,
BIRL : pLL[LV (qLL)  tLL] + pLH [LV (qLH)  tLH ] > 0; (3)
BIRH : pLH [HV (qHL)  tHL] + pHH [HV (qHH)  tHH ] > 0: (4)
Then the seller maximizes her expected prot (t;q) subject to constraints (1) to (4).
We look for the transfers such that the four constraints are all binding, i.e., which satisfy
incentive compatibility without leaving any expected rent at the interim stage to any buyer.5
Indeed, for  6= 0, the equation system of (1) to (4) is invertible since the determinant is 2.
Thus, the transfers are determined uniquely as
tLL =
 
pLLpHHL   p2LHH

V (qLL)  pLHpHHV (qLH)

; (5)
tLH =
 
pLLpHHH   p2LHL

V (qLH) + pLLpLHV (qLL)

; (6)
tHL =
 
pLLpHHL   p2LHH

V (qHL)  pLHpHHV (qHH)

; (7)
tHH =
 
pLLpHHH   p2LHL

V (qHH) + pLLpLHV (qHL)

: (8)
Substituting these transfers into the the seller's expected prot function (t;q) and then opti-
mizing this expression yield the second-best consumptions represented as functions of correlation:
5CM (1988) show that incentive constraints can be slack.
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qsb() = (qsbLL(); q
sb
LH(); q
sb
HL(); q
sb
HH()), where
LV
0[qsbLL()] = LV
0[qsbLH()] = HV
0[qsbHL()] = HV
0[qsbHH()] = c: (9)
It is easy to nd that each buyer has the same quantity as with complete information, i.e.,
qsbkl () = q
fb
kl (); 8 6= 0; 8k; l 2 fH;Lg. From the expressions of transfers (5) to (8), we observe
that, if  is positive and goes to zero, then tLL; tHL go to  1, tLH ; tHH go to +1. The
consumers' quasilinear utility function suggests that they are risk neutral on transfers. The
selling mechanism exploits the risk neutrality of the agents by specifying extreme rewards and
penalties. If the correlation is positive, a H  agent faces, when he tells the truth, an extreme
reward if the other agent is a L type and extreme penalties if the other agent is a H type.
Similarly we can work out the result for L  agent. For negative correlation, the sign of all the
transfers will be altered, which implies the opposite directions of awards and penalties. Given
such a mechanism, the buyers will always accept the contract and tell the truth. The weaker
is the correlation, the larger penalties or awards are needed to elicit truthtelling. It may not
be surprising that when buyers are very similar, it is relatively simple to extract their rents by
\cross-checking" method. A more interesting point is that the above rst-best result holds for
any degree of correlation, even if it is innitesimal.
For the case with independent types, we denote  = Pr(i = L); 1  = Pr(i = H); i = 1; 2,
then pLL = 
2; pLH = (1  ); pHH = (1  )2: The system of binding constraints can no more
be inverted. The standard method for solving single-agent adverse selection model shows that
BICH and BIRL bind in the optimum. When the transfers in (t;q) are replaced with those
obtained from BICH and BIRL written with equality, the solution to the principal's program is
characterized as qsb(0), where
L   1  



V 0[qsbLL(0)] =

L   1  



V 0[qsbLH(0)]
=HV
0[qsbHL(0)] = HV
0[qsbHH(0)] = c:
(10)
From the above two results with correlated and uncorrelated types respectively one can
see that a striking discontinuity occurs at  = 0. Indeed, for correlated types the seller can
exploit \cross-checking" method to induce their revelation at no cost, while for uncorrelated
types, he cannot do that since the report of one consumer is uninformative signal for the other
consumer's type. The rst-best allocation is thus not achievable when  = 0. The seller should
give information rents to the H buyer and, to decrease those rents, distort the quantities of the
L buyer downward.
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4 The Third Party's Optimization Program
The above analysis shows that the agents with correlated types get zero rent from playing
non-cooperatively the grand mechanism, so the optimal grand mechanism with a noncooperative
behavior creates endogenously the stakes for collusive behavior. In this section, we study formally
the third party's optimizing problem and derive the coalitional incentive constraints which must
be satised in the optimal collusion-proof grand mechanism under asymmetric information.
Assume that the third-party's optimal problem is given by:
[PT ] : max
();xi();yi()
X
(1;2)22
p(1; 2)

U1(1) + U
2(2)

subject to :
U i(i) =
X
j2
p(j ji)
"
iV

xi
 
i; j ; (i; j)

+ qi
 
(i; j)

+ yi(i; j)  ti
 
(i; j)
#
for any i 2  and i; j = 1; 2 with i 6= j;
 
BICSi

: U i(i) > U i(ei j i)
where
U i(ei j i) = X
j2
p(j ji)
"
iV

xi
 ei; j ; (ei; j)+ qi (ei; j)+ yi(ei; j)  ti (ei; j)#
for any

i; ei 2 2 and i; j = 1; 2 with i 6= j;
 
BIRSi

: U i(i) > UM (i)
for any i 2  and i = 1; 2;
(BB : y) :
2X
i=1
yi(1; 2) = 0
(BB : x) :
2X
i=1
xi(1; 2; e) = 0
for any (1; 2) 2 2 and e 2 2:
DEFINITION 1 A side mechanism
S =
n
( e1; e2); x1( e1; e2; ); x2( e1; e2; ); y1( e1; e2); y2( e1; e2)o8( e1; e2) 2 2
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is coalition-interim-ecient with respect to an incentive-compatible grand mechanism M pro-
viding the reservation utilities UM ()6 if and only if it solves the above third party program.
Let S0 
n
() = Id(); x1() = x2() = 0; y1() = y2() = 0
o
denote the null contract that
implements no manipulation of reports, no reallocation of quantities, and no side transfers, then
we have the following denition.
DEFINITION 2 An incentive-compatible grand mechanism M is weakly 7 collusion-proof if
and only if it is a truthtelling direct mechanism and the null side mechanism S0 is coalition-
interim-ecient with respect to M.
PROPOSITION 1 (Weak Collusion-Proofness Principle, WCP). Any Bayesian perfect equi-
librium of the two-stage game of contract oer and collusion contract oerMS can be achieved
by a weakly collusion-proof mechanism.
PROOF. The proof is omitted since it is a straightforward adaptation of proof in Proposition
3 of LM (2000).
The next proposition characterizes the coalitional incentive constraints which must be sat-
ised in the weakly collusion-proof grand mechanism.
PROPOSITION 2 A symmetric Bayesian incentive compatible grand mechanism M such
that the L  type's incentive constraints are not binding is weakly collusion-proof if and only if
there exists  2 [0; 1) such that:
 The following coalitional incentive constraints are satised: for a (L; L) coalition,
CICLL;LH : 2

L   p
2
LH
pLLpLH + 

V (qLL)  2tLL
> 2

L   p
2
LH
pLLpLH + 

V
qLH + qHL
2

  tLH   tHL (11)
CICLL;HH : 2

L   p
2
LH
pLLpLH + 

V (qLL)  2tLL
> 2

L   p
2
LH
pLLpLH + 

V (qHH)  2tHH (12)
6We assume here that, if buyer i vetoes S, then the other buyer still has prior beliefs about i. Therefore, if
we denote by UM (i) the expected payo of an i type in the truthful equilibrium ofM, the reservation utility for
an i type when deciding whether to accept S or not is also UM (i) (see LM (2000) for more general analysis).
7The qualier \weakly" comes from the assumption made in footnote 6.
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for a (L; H) coalition,
CICLH;LL :
L   pHH
pLH

V
 
'1(qLH + qHL)

+ HV
 
'2(qLH + qHL)
  tLH   tHL
>

L   pHH
pLH

V
 
'1(2qLL)

+ HV
 
'2(2qLL)
  2tLL (13)
CICLH;HH :
L   pHH
pLH

V
 
'1(qLH + qHL)

+ HV
 
'2(qLH + qHL)
  tLH   tHL
>

L   pHH
pLH

V
 
'1(2qHH)

+ HV
 
'2(2qHH
  2tHH (14)
for a (H ; H) coalition,
CICHH;LL : 2HV (qHH)  2tHH > 2HV (qLL)  2tLL (15)
CICHH;LH : 2HV (qHH)  2tHH > 2HV
qLH + qHL
2

  tLH   tHL; (16)
where
('1(x); '2(x)) = argmax
x1;x2:x1+x2=x

L   pHH
pLH

V (x1) + HV (x2)

(17)
is the optimal splitting rule within a heterogenous coalition.
 The following no-arbitrage-constraint (NAC) is satised:
L   pHH
pLH


V 0(qLH) = HV 0(qHL) (18)
 The H  type's incentive compatibility constraint is binding in the side-contract if and
only if  > 0.
PROOF. See appendix.
The coalitional incentive constraints under asymmetric information are obtained by express-
ing the fact that the third party has no incentive to manipulate the agents' reports. For instance,
if CICLL;LH is satised, a (L; L) coalition prefers truthtelling to report (L; H). Each coali-
tional incentive constraint takes into account the possibility of reallocation: if both agents report
the same types to the third party, each of them receives half of the total quantities available; oth-
erwise, the total quantities are split in accordance with a prot-maximizing rule. The symmetric
assumption q1(i; i) = q2(i; i), for all i 2 fH;Lg guarantees that there is no reallocation with-
in homogenous coalitions made of a pair of agents of the same types when they truthfully report
their types to the principal. In heterogeneous coalitions, however, the third party may have
incentive to reallocate the goods bought from the seller unless the no-arbitrage constraint (18)
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is satised. Therefore, conditions (11) to (16) and (18) characterize the weakly collusion-proof
mechanisms.
The variable  that enters coalitional incentive constraints can be interpreted as a transaction
cost in side contracting due to asymmetric information. If the H type's incentive compatibility
constraint is binding in the third party's program, the principal has exibility in choosing it; if
the constraint is slack, it is zero. The colluding partners usually cannot fully trust and share their
private information with each other, then the third party has to face the same incentive problem
faced by the principal and thus some transaction cost may arise. The seller has some degree of
control over this transaction cost of side contracting through the design of an appropriate grand-
mechanism. Suppose that collusion is organized under complete information, then coalitional
incentive constraints would be written with  = 0. Taking into account the transaction cost
of side contracting, true valuations must be replaced by virtual valuations in the coalitional
incentive constraints. The virtual valuation of a H type is equal to the true valuation H ,
while the virtual valuation of a L type is distorted downward to take into account the rent
the principal has to give and its value is vL;1  L   p
2
LH
pLLpLH+
in a homogeneous LL coalition,
vL;2  L   pHHpLH in a heterogeneous LH coalition.
Collusion imposes that the principal behaves as if she were facing a composite bidder (the
coalition) who has two dimensional preferences (virtual valuations) over the consumptions of
individual agents. In this sense, collusion is an issue that transforms the multi-agent unidi-
mensional mechanism design problem into a single-agent multidimensional mechanism design
problem with the additional subtlety that the willingness to pay of this single agent is endoge-
nous and inuenced by the design of the grand-mechanism.
Notice that it is easier for the principal to detect arbitrage than reporting manipulation
and side transfers. For instance, sellers of software and e-books often prohibit the buyers from
reselling their goods via license limit, real-name registration, etc. We need to consider it as a
special case when the principal has control over reallocations between the colluding agents. In
this case, the buyers could only manipulate their reports and exchange side transfers but have
no power conducting arbitrage on the goods; then the above coalitional incentive constraints
(11)-(16) simplify to the following form. 8
COROLLARY 1 If the principal has direct control over reallocations, the coalitional incentive
constraints are:
8\CICW" stands for \coalitional incentive constrain without arbitrage".
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 for a (L; L) coalition
CICWLL;LH : 2

L   p
2
LH
pLLpLH + 

V (qLL)  2tLL
>

L   p
2
LH
pLLpLH + 

[V (qLH) + V (qHL)]  tLH   tHL (19)
CICWLL;HH : 2

L   p
2
LH
pLLpLH + 

V (qLL)  2tLL
> 2

L   p
2
LH
pLLpLH + 

V (qHH)  2tHH ; (20)
 for a (L; H) coalition
CICWLH;LL :

L   pHH
pLH

V (qLH) + HV (qHL)  tLH   tHL
>

L   pHH
pLH

V (qLL) + HV (qLL)  2tLL (21)
CICWLH;HH :

L   pHH
pLH

V (qLH) + HV (qHL)  tLH   tHL
>

L   pHH
pLH

V (qHH) + HV (qHH)  2tHH ; (22)
 for a (H ; H) coalition
CICWHH;LL : 2HV (qHH)  2tHH > 2HV (qLL)  2tLL (23)
CICWHH;LH : 2HV (qHH)  2tHH > H [V (qLH) + V (qHL)]  tLH   tHL: (24)
PROOF. See appendix.
For the sake of simplicity, we introduce some new notations before proceeding with our
analysis. Let
Pf : fb() = max
ft;qg
(t;qj); s:t : BIRs[(3); (4)];
Ps : sb() = max
ft;qg
(t;qj); s:t : BIRs, BICs[(1); (2); (3); (4)];
Pw : w() = max
ft;q;2[0;1)g
(t;q; j);
s:t : BIRs, BICs, CICWs[(1); (2); (3); (4); (19)  (24)];
Pa : a() = max
ft;q;2[0;1)g
(t;q; j);
s:t : BIRs, BICs, CICs, NAC[(1); (2); (3); (4); (11)  (16); (18)]:
i(); i = fb; sb; w; a denote as functions of  the seller's optimal prots obtained in the cas-
es with complete information, asymmetric information but no collusion, information manip-
ulation but no arbitrage, both reporting manipulation and arbitrage, respectively. Mi() =
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fti();qi()g are the corresponding optimal sale mechanisms in these circumstances.9 The
following proposition gives a result concerning ranking of the principal's payos in dierent
contexts.
PROPOSITION 3 The seller's payos in dierent environments satisfy:
fb() > sb() > w() > a();
the rst inequality holds strictly if and only if  = 0.
PROOF. See appendix.
The intuition behind w > a is straightforward. Arbitrage between the agents may hurt
the principal since it helps the agents to collude with more degrees of freedom. Hence, the
principal can strictly improve her welfare by making sure that arbitrage does not take place
since she then faces a less constrained problem.
5 The Optimal Weakly Collusion-Proof Mechanism with Re-
porting Manipulation Alone
In this section, we assume the monopolist can prohibit resale of the good between the collud-
ing agents. Evidence on this abounds in reality. In the U.S., Electronic Benet Transfer system
makes tracking of the Food Stamp harder to conduct and easier to detect. Moreover, sellers
of information goods can prevent resale indirectly by streaming rentals from places like Netix
and Spotify. With the advent of high speed internet connections and adoption of platforms
capable of preventing illegal le sharing, e.g., Kindle, exclusive digital distribution is becom-
ing more feasible. Under this assumption, solving the seller's problem Pw yields the following
three propositions which characterize the weakly collusion-proof mechanisms with respectively
negative, positive and zero correlations.
PROPOSITION 4 In the presence of weakly negative correlation, 10 if H is suciently large,
then  = 1 at the optimum, the weakly collusion-proof mechanism Mw() = ftw();qw()g
entails:
9Superscripts fb, sb, w and a denote respectively \rst-best": \second-best", \without arbitrage" and \arbi-
trage".
10It means that  is smaller than and close enough to zero.
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 a vector of consumptions qw() 2 R4+ satisfying qwLL() < qwLH() < qwHH() < qwHL(),
where 24LpLH   pHH
+ pLH
+ 
H   (1  pLL)

L   p
2
LH
pLLpLH+

pLL(+ pLH)
35V 0 [qwLL()] = c; (25)
24LpLH   pHH
+ pLH
+ 
(1  pLL)

L   p
2
LH
pLLpLH+

  pHH

L   pHHpLH

2(+ pLH)pLH
35V 0 [qwLH()] = c;
(26)24 HpLH
+ pLH
+ 
(1  pLL)

L   p
2
LH
pLLpLH+

  pHHH
2(+ pLH)pLH
35V 0 [qwHL()] = c; (27)
24 HpLH
+ pLH
+ 
H +

L   pHHpLH

2 (+ pLH)
35V 0 [qwHH()] = c: (28)
 a vector of transfers tw() 2 R4 such that constraints (2), (3), (19) and (22) are binding.
PROOF. See appendix.
With weakly negative correlation, the fact that both coalitions (L; L) and (L; H) are
prevented from misreporting limits the feasible transfers that could be used by the seller to fully
extract the buyers' rents. The principal cannot make tLL; tHL largely positive, tLH ; tHH largely
negative as they are in the no-collusion outcome without violating the coalitional incentive
constraints (19), (20) and (22). A (L; L) coalition would like to avoid bearing this extreme
penalty by mimicking a (L; H) or (H ; H) one. Similarly, a (L; H) coalition would like
to mimic a (H ; H) one to get the corresponding large rewards requested in the no-collusion
outcome since tHH is then large and negative. Therefore (19), (20) and (22) are likely to be
binding. The above analysis shows that the possibility of collusion would amount to protecting
the agents with limited liability. Given that H is suciently large and monotonicity conditions
qwLL() < q
w
LH() < q
w
HH() < q
w
HL() hold,
11 local constraints (19) and (22) imply the global
constraint (20); therefore only (19) and (22) need to bind at the optimum.
For weakly negative correlation,  = 1 at the optimum.12 Indeed, there is no gain in
setting  < 1 since this would only increase the cost of the coalitional incentive constraints
(19) and (22). When information is asymmetric, each agent may want to conceal his private
information in order to increase his own utility, and this could go against the maximization
11This condition can be checked ex post.
12Although  belongs to [0; 1), we allow  to take the value equal to one since we are interested in the supremum
of the seller's prot.
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of their joint utility, so some frictions in side-contract may arise. Moreover, mutual distrust
between colluding parties is a further impediment to collusion, since the informal side-contract
between agents is usually illegal, implicit, being enforced only by trust, reciprocity or through
repeated relationships. With negative correlation, an agent anticipates that his partner's type
is more likely to be dierent from his own. The inherent vigilance against strangers prevents
them from communicating and cooperating smoothly with each other.13 The principal is then
able to exploit the agents' mutual distrust to increase the transaction cost of side contracting.
PROPOSITION 5 For a weakly positive correlation,  = 1 at the optimum. The optimal
weakly-collusion-proof mechanism Mw() = ftw();qw()g entails
 a vector of consumptions qw() 2 R4+ satisfying qwLH() < qwLL() < qwHL() = qwHH(),
where24LpLH   pHH
+ pLH

+ 
H   pLH

L   pHHpLH + H

  pHHH
(+ pLH)pLL
35V 0 [qwLL()] = c;
(29)"
LpLH   pHH
+ pLH

+ 
L   pHHpLH
+ pLH
#
V 0 [qwLH()] = c; (30)
HV
0 [qwHL()] = HV
0 [qwHH()] = c; (31)
 a vector of transfers tw() 2 R4 such that (2), (3), (21) and (23) are binding.
The seller cannot make tLL; tHL largely negative and tHH ; tLH largely positive without vio-
lating the downward coalitional incentive constraints (21), (23) and (24). When (21) holds with
equality and qwLL() > q
w
LH(), the LHS of (23) is larger than that of (24), so only (21) and
(23) are binding at the optimum. The fact that  = 1 at the optimum implies that the buyers
lacking power to reallocate their total purchases cannot collude frictionlessly even if they have
positive correlated types.
It is worth noting that our result here is in contrast to LM (2000). In a public good provision
environment, they characterize the weakly collusion-proof mechanism with weakly positive cor-
relation. It is shown that  = 0 at the optimum (Proposition 5 of LM (2000)). In their model,
two agents may consume the same amount of nonexcludable public goods even if they report
dierent valuations to the principal and the quantities are decreasing: xHH > xHL > xLL.
Then, the lower the transaction cost set by the principal, the higher the virtual valuation of the
13As an old saying goes: birds of the same feather ock together.
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low-type agent, and the lower incentive a (L; H) coalition may have to misreport (L; L).
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Therefore, the principal prefers to set  = 0, as if there is no friction within side contract.
However, things are quite dierent in our private good environment, in which consumers with
dierent valuations are allocated with dierent amounts of goods. The consumption allocated
to a low-type agent in a heterogeneous coalition is smaller than that in a homogeneous coalition,
i.e., qLH < qLL. The intuition is as follows. Since (3) binds at the optimum, the expected
information rent that a high-type agent can obtain by pretending to be a low-type one is given
by pLHUHL + pHHUHH = [pLHV (qLL) + pHHV (qLH)]. Because of the well-known trade-o
between eciency and rent extraction, it is optimal to introduce downward distortions of both
qLL and qLH compared to their respective rst-best levels. For very small , the impact of coali-
tional incentive constraints on qLL and qLH is negligibly small compared to the impact of the
individual incentive constraint. The marginal benet-marginal cost ratios of these two variables
are respectively pLL=pLH and pLH=pHH . With positive correlation, it is clear that the former
dominates the latter term, so qLL is less distorted than qLH in equilibrium. Therefore, the higher
the value of , the lower the virtual valuation of a low-type agent, and the weaker incentive a
(L; H) coalition may have to misreport (L; L). Then, by setting 
 = 1, the principal is able
to exploit the distributional inequality between agents to deter their collusion.
The coalitional incentive constraints are illustrated in the following FIGURE 1 and FIGURE
2. Here and in later diagrams a solid line pointing from type ij to type i0j0 means that the
incentive constraint that ij not be tempted to choose the i0j0 contract is binding. A dotted line
implies that the corresponding constraint is slack. As stated above, the principal's two-agent uni-
dimensional collusion-preventing problem is equivalent to a single-agent two-dimensional mech-
anism design problem. The multidimensional mechanism design model diers markedly from
and is signicantly more complex than its one-dimensional counterpart. It is essentially because
dierent types of agents cannot be unambiguously ordered, therefore the directions in which
incentive constraints bind are dicult to determine. The benet from focusing on a discrete two
by two model, however, makes this problem tractable. With weakly negative correlation, the
two-dimensional types are ordered decreasingly as: (vL;1; 
v
L;1) ! (vL;2; H) ! (H ; H). With
weakly positive correlation, they are ordered as: (H ; H) ! (vL;1; vL;1) ! (2L;2; H), but in
this case both the \highest" and \lowest" types have incentive to misreport the \intermediate"
14The CICHL;LL in LM (2000) is
H + L   pHH
pLH

xHL   tHL   tLH >

H + L   pHH
pLH

xLL   2tLL
. Given xHL > xLL, it is clear that a smaller  will make this constraint easier to be satised.
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binding
slack
FIGURE 1.  < 0 without arbitrage
binding
slack
FIGURE 2.  > 0 without arbitrage
type.
PROPOSITION 6 Assume that types are independently distributed, i.e.,  = 0, then there
exists a transfer scheme t 2 R4 such that (2) and (3) are binding and fqsb(0); tg is weakly
collusion-proof, i.e., qw(0) = qsb(0).
PROOF. See appendix.
Summarizing the above discussion, we have the following theorem.
THEOREM 1 For two-agent nonlinear pricing environments with correlated types, collusive
behavior cannot be prevented freely so that reporting manipulation calls for distortions away from
the rst-best eciency. Specically, the optimal mechanism with reporting manipulation alone
entails:
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 downward distortions for the consumptions of low-demand type for correlated types and no
distortion for them for uncorrelated types:
qwLL()
8>>><>>>:
< qsbLL() = q
fb
LL() if  > 0
= qsbLL() < q
fb
LL() if  = 0
< qsbLL() = q
fb
LL() if  < 0
;
qwLH()
8>>><>>>:
< qsbLH() = q
fb
LH() if  > 0
= qsbLH() < q
fb
LH() if  = 0
< qsbLH() = q
fb
LH() if  < 0
;
 no distortion for the consumptions of high-demand type for nonnegative correlation and
upward distortions for them for negative correlation:
qwHL()
8>>><>>>:
= qsbHL() = q
fb
HL() if  > 0
= qsbHL() = q
fb
HL() if  = 0
> qsbHL() = q
fb
HL() if  < 0
;
qwHH()
8>>><>>>:
= qsbHH() = q
fb
HH() if  > 0
= qsbHH() = q
fb
HH() if  = 0
> qsbHH() = q
fb
HH() if  < 0
;
 the possibility of reporting manipulation reduces strictly the seller's prot for correlated
types; it will not hurt the principal if types are uncorrelated:
w()
8<: < sb() = fb() if  6= 0= sb() < fb() if  = 0 ; (32)
 the consumptions qw() and the eciency implemented w() are continuous with respect
to correlation:
lim
#0
qwij() = lim
"0
qwij() = q
w
ij(0) = q
sb
ij (0); 8i; j 2 fH;Lg
lim
#0
w() = lim
"0
w() = w(0) = sb(0): (33)
PROOF. See appendix.
In the case of negative correlation, the individual incentive constraint is binding for a down-
ward manipulation while the coalitional incentive constraints are binding for upward manipula-
tions. Hence, collusion creates countervailing incentives and this makes the optimal collusion-
proof consumptions exhibit an upward distortion at the top and a downward distortion at the
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bottom with respect to the optimal scheme without side-contracting.15 Lacking power to re-
allocate their total quantities, the agents could collude with a homogeneous transaction cost
(i.e.,  = 1), regardless of the signs of their correlation. This is why the discontinuity at  = 0
disappears. For nonzero , the collusion-proof constraints prevent the use of the penalty and
award system embedded in the FSE mechanism. It oers a rather satisfactory solution of this
puzzle which explains to some extent the lack of practical success of explicit yardstick mecha-
nisms. The possibility of collusion enables the two agents to collectively extract rents from the
principal, i.e., to succeed in forming a pressure group.
6 The Optimal Weakly Collusion-Proof Mechanism with Both
Reporting Manipulation and Arbitrage
If buyers could conduct arbitrage within their cartel, the optimal weakly collusion-proof
mechanism could be obtained through solving program Pa. The diculty, as usual, is to de-
termine the binding constraints. To simplify the constraints system, it is useful to derive the
following implementability conditions.
Lemma 1 For a weak correlation, the schedule of collusion-proof implementable consumptions
satises the following monotonicity condition:
[M] : qLL 6
qLH + qHL
2
6 qHH (34)
for all  2 [0; 1); if these inequalities hold for all  2 [0; 1), the local coalitional incentive
constraints (11), (14) or (13), (16) are binding, then all the other coalitional incentive constraints
are indeed satised.
PROOF. See appendix.
The relationships among coalitional incentive constraints are depicted in the following FIG-
URE 3.
Given this result, we could focus in the sequel only on the H agent's Bayesian incentive
constraint (2); the L agent's individual rationality constraint (3); the local coalitional incentive
constraints (11), (14) or (13), (16); no-arbitrage constraint (18) and the implementability con-
dition (34). Then we can now simplify the principal's problem as the following program [Pa ] or
15See Lewis and Sappington (1989), Maggi and Rodriguez (1995) and Jullien (1999) for detailed discussion of
countervailing incentives.
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bindingCICLL;LH(11)
2qLL6qLH+qHL          ! CICLH;LL(13)
+ +
bindingCICLH;HH(14)
2qHH>qLH+qHL           ! CICHH;LH(16)??y2qHH>qLH+qHL ??y2qLL6qLH+qHL
CICLL;HH(12) CICHH;LL(15)
bindingCICLL;LH(13)
2qLL6qLH+qHL          ! CICLH;LL(11)
+ +
bindingCICLH;HH(16)
2qHH>qLH+qHL           ! CICHH;LH(14)??y2qLL6qLH+qHL ??y2qHH>qLH+qHL
CICLL;HH(15) CICHH;LL(12)
FIGURE 3. Relationships among CICs in the case with arbitrage
[Pa+].
[Pa ] :
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
max
ft;q;2[0;1)g
(t;q; )
subject to:
BIRL; BICH ; CICLL;LH ; CICLH;HH ; NAC;M
[(2); (3); (11); (14); (18); (34)] ;
[Pa+] :
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
max
ft;q;2[0;1)g
(t;q; )
subject to:
BIRL; BICH ; CICHH;LH ; CICLH;LL; NAC;M
[(2); (3); (13); (16); (18); (34)] :
The following two propositions show that [Pw+] and [P
w
 ] correspond to the cases with weakly
positive and negative correlations respectively.
PROPOSITION 7 Assuming that the correlation is weakly negative, then  = 1 is the
principal's optimal choice. The optimal weakly-collusion-proof mechanism with both reports
manipulation and arbitrage entails:
 a schedule of consumptions qa() 2 R4+ such that
HpLH
+ pLH

V 0(qHH) +
HV
0 ('2(2qHH))
+ pLH
= c; (35)

HpLH
+ pLH

V 0(qHL) +

h
(1  pLL)V 0
 
qLH+qHL
2
 
L   p
2
LH
pLLpLH+

  pHHHV 0(qHL)
i
2(+ pLH)pLH
= c; (36)

LpLH   pHH
+ pLH

V 0(qLH) +

h
(1  pLL)V 0
 
qLH+qHL
2
 
L   p
2
LH
pLLpLH+

  pHHHV 0(qHL)
i
2(+ pLH)pLH
= c;
(37)
21
24LpLH   pHH
+ pLH
+
H
(+ pLH) pLL
 
(1  pLL)

L   p
2
LH
pLLpLH+

pLL(+ pLH)
35V 0(qLL) = c: (38)
 a vector of transfers ta 2 R4 such that (2), (3), (11), (14) are binding.
 a surplus strictly lower than that attained in the case without arbitrage: a() < w() .
PROOF. See appendix.
The fact that coalition (L; L) (resp. (L; H)) is prevented from misreporting (L; H) (resp.
(H ; H)), limits the extreme awards or penalties that could be used by the FSE mechanism.
This leads to binding local upward coalitional incentive constraints (11) and (14). Conducting
arbitrage will apparently increase the total surplus of a coalition.16 After optimally allocating the
total quantities, a (L; L) (resp. (L; H)) coalition is more likely to be tempted to overreport
(L; H) (resp. (H ; H)). Hence, it is more reasonable for the principal to disincentive their
misreports by setting  = 1 and decreasing the virtual valuations of low-type agent.
PROPOSITION 8 For weakly positive correlation, the seller will choose  = 0 at the opti-
mum, and the optimal weakly collusion-proof mechanism Ma() with both reporting manipu-
lation and arbitrage entails:
 a strictly increasing schedule of consumptions: qaLL() < qaLH() < qaHL() < qaHH() given
by 
LpLH   pHH
+ pLH
+
H
(+ pLH) pLL

V 0(qLL)  (1  pLL)
pLL(+ pLH)
HV
0 ('2(2qLL)) = c (39)

LpLH pHH
+pLH

V 0 (qLH) + 

(1 pLL)LV 0(qLH ) pHHHV 0

qLH+qHL
2

2(+pLH )pLH

  LV 00(qLH) = c (40)
HpLH
+pLH

V 0 (qHL) + 

(1 pLL)HV 0(qHL) pHHHV 0

qHL+qHL
2

2(+pLH )pLH

+ HV
00(qHL) = c; (41)
HV
0(qHH) = c; (42)
where positive parameter  is the Lagrangean multiplier of NAC written with  = 0;
 a vector of transfers ta 2 R4 such that (2), (3), (13), (16) are binding;
 a prot strictly lower than its counterpart in the case without arbitrage: a() < w().
PROOF. See appendix.
The reason why upward coalitional constraints (13) and (16) bind at the optimum is the con-
icts between these constraints and the extreme award and penalty used by FSE mechanism.
For a weakly positive correlation,  = 0 at the optimum. This is a notable dierence in propo-
sition 8 compared to propositions 4, 5 and 7, where the principal sets the collusive transaction
16The RHS of (11) (resp. (15)) is larger than that of (19) (resp. (23)).
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cost at its highest possible level, i.e.,  = 1. H   vL;2 =  (1 + pHH=pLH) means the higher
the transaction cost of collusion, the larger the divergence of preferences between agents in a
(L; H) coalition. Therefore, when reallocation is infeasible, a coalition with a larger  prefers
the unequal allocation f(qLH ; tLH); (qHL; tHL)g to the equal one f(qLL; tLL); (qLL; tLL)g more
than a coalition with a smaller . When the agents could conduct reallocation, however, a coali-
tion may care only about the total quantities obtained rather than that allocated to individual
agent by the principal. A smaller  will weaken the incentive of a LH coalition to underreport
(L; L). Having a strictly positive  would only make coalitional incentive constraint (13) harder
to satisfy. In a word, the presence of asymmetries increases the frictions among the colluding
parties; but this eect vanishes when quantities reallocation is feasible. The binding coalitional
incentive constraint (13) takes therefore the same form as if consumers could credibly share
their information within the coalition. Everything happens as if asymmetric information does
not really undermine the agents' ability of colluding, except that their individual incentive and
participation constraints are the interim ones.
Ignoring the no-arbitrage constraint at rst and then checking it ex post, we nd that
this constraint cannot be satised automatically. This is because the quantities derived from
optimization satisfy (L   pHH=pLH)V (qLH) = HV (qHL). However, the NAC written with
 = 0 requires LV (qLH) = HV (qHL). The conict between (18) and the remaining constraints
calls for a further distortion away from the eciency implemented. The set of binding and
slack coalitional incentive constraints with arbitrage is depicted in Figure 4 and 5. For negative
correlation, the multidimensional types of the composite agent (coalition) could be ordered
decreasingly as (vL;1; 
v
L;1) ! (vL;1; H) ! (H ; H), which is identical to the arbitrage-free
case. For positive correlation, the multidimensional types are ordered conversely as (H ; H)!
(vL;1; H)! (vL;1; vL;1).
In the degenerate case of no correlation, we have the following result.
PROPOSITION 9 When arbitrage are possible and the agents' types are independent ( =
0), then  = 1 and there exists a vector of transfers t 2 R4 such that M = ft;qsb(0)g is the
weakly collusion-proof mechanism. That is to say, Ma(0) =Msb(0) and a(0) = sb(0).
PROOF. See appendix.
This proposition states that an optimal mechanism in the absence of buyer coalition is also
weakly collusion-proof with uncorrelated types. It is in line with the main nding of JM (2005).
Summarizing the discussion, we have the following theorem.
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binding
slack
FIGURE 4.  < 0 with arbitrage
binding
slack
FIGURE 5.  > 0 with arbitrage
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THEOREM 2 For two-agent nonlinear pricing environments with correlated types, collusive
behavior cannot be prevented freely so that arbitrage calls for further distortion away from the
rst-best eciency that is lower than the second-best eciency. Specically, with both reporting
manipulation and arbitrage, the collusion-proof mechanism Ma() = (ta(); qa()) entails the
following:
 for weakly positive correlation, there is no distortion with respect to the no collusion out-
come for qaHH(), and downward distortions for other quantities; for weakly negative cor-
relation, there are downward distortions for qaLL(); q
a
LH() and upward distortions for
qaHL(); q
a
HH(); for zero correlation, there is no distortion for any q
a
ij(); i; j 2 fH;Lg,
qaLL()
8>>><>>>:
< qsbLL() = q
fb
LL() if  > 0
= qsbLL() < q
fb
LL() if  = 0
< qsbLL() = q
fb
LL() if  < 0
;
qaLH()
8>>><>>>:
< qsbLH() = q
fb
LH() if  > 0
= qsbLH() < q
fb
LH() if  = 0
< qsbLH() = q
fb
LH() if  < 0
;
qaHL()
8>>><>>>:
< qsbHL() = q
fb
HL() if  > 0
= qsbHL() < q
fb
HL() if  = 0
> qsbHL() = q
fb
HL() if  < 0
;
qaHH()
8>>><>>>:
= qsbHH() = q
fb
HH() if  > 0
= qsbHH() < q
fb
HH() if  = 0
> qsbHH() = q
fb
HH() if  < 0
;
 consumptions qaLL(); qaHH() are continuous at  = 0, but qaLH() and qaHL() are only
continuous from the left hand side at  = 0
lim
"0
qaij() = q
a
ij(0) = q
w
ij(0) = q
sb
ij (0); 8i; j 2 fH;Lg;
lim
#0
qaLL() = q
a
LL(0) = q
w
LH(0) = q
sb
LH(0);
lim
#0
qaHH() = q
a
HH(0) = q
w
HH(0) = q
sb
HH(0);
lim
#0
qaLH() > q
a
LH(0) = q
w
LH(0) = q
sb
LH(0);
lim
#0
qaHL() < q
a
HL(0) = q
w
HL(0) = q
sb
HL(0);
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 the seller's prot is only left-continuous with respect to  at zero correlation,
lim
#0
a() < a(0) = lim
"0
a(): (43)
For positive correlation, both individual and coalitional incentive constraints are binding for
downward manipulation, a trade-o between eciency and rent extraction calls for a further
downward distortions of qLH and qLL than the case without side contracting, but no distortion
for qHH . For negative correlation, however, the individual incentive constraint is binding for
a downward manipulation while the coalitional incentive constraints are binding for upward
manipulations. Hence, collusion creates countervailing incentives and this calls for two-way
distortions for quantities: qHL and qHH are distorted upwardly; qLH and qLL are distorted
downwardly compared to the quantities without side-contracting. This is analogous to the
argument underlying Corollary 1 in this paper, and the only dierence is that now we have
2qaLL() 6 qaHL() + qaLH() 6 2qaHH().
Corollaries 1 and 2 imply that the eciency distortion originated from arbitrage-preventing
gradually vanishes as  approaches zero from left side: lim"0[a()   w()] = 0; however, a
non-vanishing fraction exists when  approaches zero from right side: lim#0[a() w()] < 0.
Such a discontinuity stems from the heterogeneous transaction costs of collusion. The optimal
transaction costs chosen by the principal in dierent collusion environments could be summarized
in the following table.
without arbitrage with arbitrage
 < 0  = 1  = 1
 = 0  2 [0; 1]  = 1
 > 0  = 1  = 0
TABLE 1. Transaction costs in dierent collusion environments
It can be seen that in the case without arbitrage, the transaction costs are homogeneous
regardless of the sign of correlation. In the case with arbitrage, however, the transaction costs
are heterogeneous. The possibility of arbitrage enables the agents to optimally reallocate their
resources and hence to disincentive a (L; H) coalition to underreport (L; L). The principal
may thus choose a lowest possible transaction cost to alleviate the coalitional incentive constraint
at the cost of breaking the continuity of optimal mechanism with respect to correlation.
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7 Conclusion
Applying CM's FSE mechanism, the principal may exploit the correlation between agents'
private information to elicit their truthtelling at no cost. For the purpose of protecting their
rents, agents may collude at the principal's loss by coordinating their reports and conducting
arbitrage on their total resources. As such, the principal needs to ght o collusion by design-
ing her grand mechanism. This raises a natural question concerning how the transaction cost
associated with agents' private information can be exploited to overcome collusion. CK (2006)
have shown that the the principal can always ght o collusion at no cost in a broad class of
economic enviroments with n  2 agents for uncorrelated types and n  3 agents for correlated
types.
We nd in this paper that their ndings are no longer true if there exist only two agents
when types are correlated. In a private good nonlinear pricing environment with correlation and
arbitrage, we show that collusion calls for distortion away from the noncollusive eciency, that
is, collusion cannot be preventable at no cost. Moreover, we nd that the distortionary ways
are quite dierent for positive and negative correlations. For negative correlation, the distortion
vanishes as the correlation goes to zero; for positive correlation, on the contrary, there exists a
nonvanishing fraction of distortion. The collusion-proof mechanism is therefore discontinuous
with respect to information structure. This discontinuity of mechanism relies on the fact that
the principal may choose heterogeneous transaction costs of collusion when arbitrage is possible.
As such, it is optimal for her to choose a highest (resp. lowest) possible transaction cost in the
presence of negative (resp. positive) correlation.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
Let kl = (k; l); k; l 2 fH;Lg for simplicity. Since we are not interested in grand-mechanisms
such that the L agents' incentive constraints are binding (these constraints will be satised ex
post), the third-party's problem can be written as:
max
();xi();yi()
X
(1;2)22
p(1; 2)
(
2X
i=1
h
iV
 
xi(1; 2; (1; 2)) + qi((1; 2))
  ti (1; 2)i)
subject to the following constraints.
 Budget balance:
(BB : y)
X
k=1;2
yk(1; 2) = 0; 8(1; 2) 2 2 (44)
(BB : x)
X
k=1;2
xk(1; 2; ) = 0; 8(1; 2) 2 2; 8 2 2: (45)
 Bayesian incentive constraints for respectively the H 1 and 2:
BICS1 (H) : pLH
h
HV
 
x1(H ; L; HL) + q1(HL)

+ y1(H ; L)  t1(HL)
i
+pHH
h
HV
 
x1(H ; H ; HH) + q1(HH)

+ y1(H ; H)  t1(HH)
i
> pLH
h
HV
 
x1(L; L; LL) + q1(LL)

+ y1(L; L)  t1(LL)
i
+pHH
h
HV
 
x1(L; H ; LH) + q1(LH)

+ y1(L; H)  t1(LH)
i
(46)
BICS2 (H) : pLH
h
HV
 
x2(L; H ; LH) + q2(LH)

+ y2(L; H)  t2(LH)
i
+pHH
h
HV
 
x2(H ; H ; HH) + q2(HH)

+ y2(H ; H)  t2(HH)
i
> pLH
h
HV
 
x2(L; L; LL) + q2(LL)

+ y2(L; L)  t2(LL)
i
+pHH
h
HV
 
x2(H ; L; HL) + q2(HL)

+ y2(H ; L)  t2(HL)
i
;
(47)
 Bayesian participation constraints for respectively the H 1 and 2:
BIRS1 (H) :pLH
h
HV
 
x1(H ; L; HL) + q1(HL)

+ y1(H ; L)  t1(HL)
i
+pHH
h
HV
 
x1(H ; H ; HH) + q1(HH)

+ y1(H ; H)  t1(HH)
i
>(pLH + pHH)UM1 (H)
(48)
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BIRS2 (H) :pLH
h
HV
 
x2(L; H ; LH) + q2(LH)

+ y2(L; H)  t2(LH)
i
+pHH
h
HV
 
x2(H ; H ; HH) + q2(HH)

+ y2(H ; H)  t2(HH)
i
>(pLH + pHH)UM2 (H);
(49)
 Participation constraints for respectively the L agents 1 and 2:
BIRS1 (L) :pLL
h
LV
 
x1(L; L; LL) + q1(LL)

+ y1(L; L)  t1(LL)
i
+pLH
h
LV
 
x1(L; H ; LH) + q1(LH)

+ y1(L; H)  t1(LH)
i
>(pLL + pLH)UM1 (L)
(50)
BIRS2 (L) :pLL
h
LV
 
x2(L; L; LL) + q2(LL)

+ y2(L; L)  t2(LL)
i
+pLH
h
LV
 
x2(H ; L; HL) + q2(HL)

+ y2(H ; L)  t2(HL)
i
>(pLL + pLH)UM2 (L):
(51)
Let us introduce the following multipliers (1; 2); (1; 2); 1; 2; 1; 2; 1; 2; associated
with constraints (44) to (51) respectively. We write the Lagrangean function of the above
maximization problem as:
L =E(U1 + U2) +
2X
i=1
iBIC
S
i (H) +
2X
i=1
iBIR
S
i (H) +
2X
i=1
iBIR
S
i (L)
+
X
(1;2)22
(1; 2)(BB : y)(1; 2) +
X
(1;2)22
(1; 2)(BB : x)(1; 2):
 Maximizing with respect to y1(; ); y2(; ) yields
y1(L; L) : (L; L)  pLH1 + pLL1 = 0; (52)
y2(L; L) : (L; L)  pLH2 + pLL2 = 0; (53)
y1(L; H) : (L; H)  pHH1 + pLH1 = 0; (54)
y2(L; H) : (L; H) + pLH (2 + 2) = 0; (55)
y1(H ; L) : (H ; L) + pLH (1 + 1) = 0; (56)
y2(H ; L) : (H ; L) + pLH2   pHH2 = 0; (57)
y1(H ; H) : (H ; H) + pHH (1 + 1) = 0; (58)
y2(H ; H) : (H ; H) + pHH (2 + 2) = 0: (59)
Expressions (52) and (53) imply
 pLH1 + pLL1 =  pLH2 + pLL2: (60)
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(54) and (55) imply
2 + 2 = 1  
pHH
pLH
1: (61)
(56) and (57) imply
1 + 1 = 2  
pHH
pLH
2: (62)
(58) and (59) imply
1 + 1 = 2 + 2: (63)
In what follows, without loss of generality, we consider the symmetric multipliers 1 =
2  ; 1 = 2  ; 1 = 2  :
 Maximizing with respect to x1(; ; ); x2(; ; ) yields
(L; L) + (pLLL   pLH1H + pLL1L)V 0
 
x1(L; L; LL) + q1(LL)

= 0; (64)
(L; L) + (pLLL   pLH2H + pLL2L)V 0
 
x2(L; L; LL) + q2(LL)

= 0; (65)
(L; H) + (pLHL   pHHH1 + pLH1L)V 0
 
x1(L; H ; LH) + q1(LH)

= 0; (66)
(L; H) + (pLHH + pLHH2 + pLH2H)V
0 x2(L; H ; LH) + q2(LH) = 0; (67)
(H ; L) + (pLHH + pLHH1 + pLH1H)V
0 x1(H ; L; HL) + q1(HL) = 0; (68)
(H ; L) + (pLHL   pHHH2 + pLH2L)V 0
 
x2(H ; L; HL) + q2(HL)

= 0; (69)
(H ; H) + (pHHH + pHHH1 + pHHH1)V
0 x1(H ; H ; HH) + q1(HH) = 0; (70)
(H ; H) + (pHHH + pHHH2 + pHHH2)V
0 x2(H ; H ; HH) + q2(HH) = 0: (71)
(64) and (65) imply
V 0
 
x1(L; L; LL) + q1(LL)

= V 0
 
x2(L; L; LL) + q2(LL)

; 8LL 2 2:
(70) and (71) imply
V 0
 
x1(H ; H ; HH) + q1(HH

= V 0
 
x2(H ; H ; HH) + q2(HH)

; 8HH 2 2:
Since x1(L; L; LL) + x2(L; L; LL) = 0; x1(H ; H ; HH) + x2(H ; H ; HH) = 0 from
a budget-balance constraint, we have
x1(L; L; LL) + q1(LL) = x2(L; L; LL) + q2(LL) =
q1(LL) + q2(LL)
2
; 8LL(72)
x1(H ; H ; HH) + q1(HH) = x2(H ; H ; HH) + q2(HH) =
q1(HH) + q2(HH)
2
; 8HH :(73)
(66) and (67) imply
L   pHH
pLH
H1 + 1L

V 0
 
x1(L; H ; LH) + q1(LH)

=(1 + 2 + 2) HV
0 x2(L; H ; LH) + q2(LH)
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Using (61), we obtain
L   pHH
pLH


V 0
 
x1(L; H ; LH)+q1(LH)

= HV
0 x2(L; H ; LH)+q2(LH); 8LH
where
 =

1 +  + 
:
Similarly, expressions (68), (69) and (62) imply
HV
0 x1(H ; L; HL)+q1(HL) = L   pHH
pLH


V 0
 
x2(H ; L; HL)+q2(HL)

; 8HL:
With budget-balance constraints x1(k; l; kl) + x2(k; l; kl) = 0;8k; l 2 fH;Lg; k 6= l ,
the total quantity available to a heterogeneous coalition is split according to the following
rule:
x1(L; H ; LH) + q1(LH) = '1
 
q1(LH) + q2(LH)

; (74)
x2(L; H ; LH) + q2(LH) = '2
 
q1(LH) + q2(LH)

; (75)
x1(H ; L; HL) + q1(HL) = '2
 
q1(HL) + q2(HL)

; (76)
x2(H ; L; HL) + q2(HL) = '1
 
q1(HL) + q2(HL)

; (77)
for any ij 2 2, where
('1(x); '2(x)) = argmax
x1;x2:x1+x2=x

L   pHH
pLH

V (x1) + HV (x2)

:
For weakly collusion-proof grand mechanism, (1; 2) = (1; 2); xi
 
1; 2; (1; 2)

= 0;
so (72) and (73) are trivially satised. Expressions (74) and (75) (or (76) and (77)) imply
qLH = '1 (qLH + qHL) ; qHL = '2 (qLH + qHL) ;
or equivalently, 
L   pHH
pLH


V 0(qLH) = HV 0(qHL): (78)
This condition states that if the quantities allocated by the principal to agents maximize
their total payo, then the third party has no incentive to conduct reallocation. Therefore,
we call it \no-arbitrage constraint (NAC)".
 The optimal manipulation of reports.
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{ Optimizing with respect to LL yields
LL 2 argmax
LL
n
pLL
h
LV
 
x1(L; L; LL) + q1(LL)

+ LV
 
x2(L; L; LL) + q2(LL)

  t1(LL)  t2(LL)
i
+ pLL1

LV
 
x1(L; L; LL) + q1(LL)
  t1(LL)
+ pLL2

LV
 
x2(L; L; LL) + q2(LL)
  t2(LL)
  pLH1

HV
 
x2(L; L; LL) + q2(LL)
  t1(LL)
  pLH2

HV
 
x1(L; L; LL) + q2(LL)
  t1(LL)o:
Note that at symmetric equilibrium 1 = 2 = ; 1 = 2 = ; 1 = 2 = , then from
constraints (60) to (62) and (72), (73) the objective function can be written as
(pLL + pLL1   pLH1)

LV
 
x1(L; L; LL) + q1(LL)
  t1(LL)
+(pLL + pLL2   pLH2)

LV
 
x2(L; L; LL) + q2(LL)
  t2(LL)
 pLH1V
 
x1(L; L; LL) + q1(LL)
  pLH2V  x2(L; L; LL) + q2(LL)
=(pLL + pLL   pLH)

(
L   p
2
LH
pLLpLH + 
h
V
 
x1(L; L; LL) + q1(LL)

+ V
 
x2(L; L; LL) + q2(LL)
i
 t1(LL)  t2(LL)
)
=(pLL + pLL   pLH)
(
2

L   p
2
LH
pLLpLH + 

V

q1(LL) + q2(LL)
2

  t1(LL)  t2(LL)
)
:
(79)
Hence, we have
LL 2 argmax
LL
(
2

L   p
2
LH
pLLpLH + 

V

q1(LL) + q2(LL)
2

  t1(LL)  t2(LL)
)
:
(80)
{ Similarly, optimizing with respect to LH and HL yields respectively
LH 2 argmax
LH

L   pHH
pLH

V
 
x1(L; H ; LH) + q1(LH)

+ HV
 
x2(L; H ; LH) + q2(LH)
  t1(LH)  t2(LH)
= argmax
LH

L   pHH
pLH

V

'1
 
q1(LH) + q1(LH)

+ HV ('2(q1(LH) + q2(LH)))  t1(LH)  t2(LH)

(81)
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and
HL 2 argmax
HL

L   pHH
pLH

V
 
x2(H ; L; HL) + q2(HL)

+ HV
 
x1(H ; L; HL) + q1(HL)
  t1(HL)  t2(HL)
= argmax
HL

L   pHH
pLH

V

'1
 
q1(HL) + q1(HL)

+ HV ('2(q1(HL) + q2(HL))  t1(HL)  t2(HL)

:
(82)
{ Optimizing with respect to HH yields
HH 2 argmax
HH

HV
 
x1(H ; H ; HH) + q1(HH)

+ HV
 
x2(H ; H ; HH) + q2(HH)

  t1(HH)  t2(HH)

= argmax
HH

2HV

q1(HH) + q2(HH)
2

  t1(HH)  t2(HH)

:
(83)
 In a weakly collusion-proof mechanism (1; 2) = (1; 2), inserting into (80), (81), (82)
and (83) yields coalitional incentive constraints (11) to (16) in the main text.
 Note that  = 1++ 2 [0; 1): Moreover,  > 0 when the Bayesian incentive constraints
(46) and (47) are binding in the third party's optimizing problem.
 Note that participation constraints (48) to (51) are binding for a weakly collusion-proof
mechanism. Hence the slackness condition obtained from the Lagrangean optimization
does not give any information on . Therefore,  is a free variable in the principal's
programme.
Proof of Corollary 1
In the absence of arbitrage, let xi (1; 2;(1; 2)) = 0; i = 1; 2 in (79), (81), (82)and (83), then
we get
LL 2 argmax
LL
n
L   p
2
LH
pLLpLH+

[V (q1(LL)) + V (q2(LL))]  t1(LL)  t2(LL)
o
;
LH 2 argmax
LH

L   pHH
pLH

V
 
q1(LH)

+ HV
 
q2(LH)
  t1(LH)  t2(LH);
HL 2 argmax
HL

L   pHH
pLH

V
 
q2(HL)

+ HV
 
q1(HL)
  t1(HL)  t2(HL);
HH 2 argmax
HH

HV
 
q1(HH)

+ HV
 
q2(HH)
  t1(HH)  t2(HH):
Substituting (1; 2) = (1; 2) into the above expressions yields constraints (19) to (22).
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Proof of Proposition 3
Let
Da = (t;q) j t 2 R4;q 2 R4+; s:t : (1)  (4); (11)  (18)	
and
Dw = (t;q) j t 2 R4;q 2 R4+; s:t : (1)  (4); (19)  (24)	
represent the feasible regions of the principal's problem with and without arbitrage, respectively.
Denote by `i; ri; i =11 to 16 and 19 to 24 the left and right hand sides of the above coalitional
incentive constraints. Note that under NAC (18), qLH = '1(qLH + qHL); qHL = '2(qLH + qHL),
then `11 = `19; `12 = `20; `13 = `21; `14 = `22; `15 = `23; `16 = `24, and it is obvious that r11 >
r19; r12 = r20; r13 > r21; r14 > r22; r15 = r23; r16 > r24, so Da  Dw, therefore w() > a().
The other two inequalities fb() > sb() > w() are straightforward.
Proof of Proposition 4
If  < 0, we write the H type's incentive constraint (2), the L type's participation constraint (3),
and local upward coalitional incentive constraints (19) and (22) as binding ones by introducing
nonnegative parameters "i; i = 2; 3; 19; 22.
26666664
pLL pLH 0 0
pLH pHH  pLH  pHH
2  1  1 0
0 1 1  2
37777775
26666664
tLL
tLH
tHL
tHH
37777775 =
26666664
3   "3
2 + "2
19   "19
22   "22
37777775 ;
where
26666664
3
2
19
22
37777775 
26666664
LpLLV (qLL) + LpLHV (qLH)
HpLH [V (qLL)  V (qHL)] + HpHH [V (qLH)  V (qHH)]
L   p
2
LH
pLLpLH+

[2V (qLL)  V (qLH)  V (qHL)]
L   pHHpLH

[V (qLH)  V (qHH)] + H [V (qHL)  V (qHH)]
37777775 :
The expected transfer is therefore
E[t(1; 2)] =
X
i2fH;Lg
X
j2fH;Lg
pijtij =
pLH + pHH
+ pLH
(3   "3)  pLH
+ pLH
(2 + "2)
  (1  pLL)
2(+ pLH)
(19   "19)  pHH
2(+ pLH)
(22   "22):
(84)
Note that  < 0 and 2V (qLL) < V (qLH) + V (qHL)(It can be checked ex post.), so the seller will
choose  = 1; "i = 0; i = 2; 3; 19; 22 at the optimum.
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Substituting (84) into the seller's objective function (t;q) and then optimizing with re-
spect to qij yields expressions (25)-(28). With weakly negative correlation, the monotonicity
of consumptions can be veried as follows. qwLi() < q
w
Hj(); 8(i; j) 2 fH;Lg  fH;Lg is easily
obtained when  is suciently close to zero. qwLL() < q
w
LH() holds when


H (1 pLL)

L  p
2
LH
pLLpLH+

(+pLH)pLL
 


(1 pLL)

L  p
2
LH
pLLpLH+

 pHH

L  pHHpLH

2pLH(+pLH)
= 2pLLpLH(+pLH)
h
2pLH

1 +
p2LH
pLLpLH+

  pHHpLL(pHH+pLH)+pLLpLH
i
< 0:
This condition is obviously satised for weakly negative correlation. qwHH() < q
w
HL() is ensured
by

H+

L  pHHpLH

2(+pLH)
  
(1 pLL)

L  p
2
LH
pLLpLH+

 pHHH
2(+pLH)pLH
= 2(+pLH)pLH
h
(pLH+pHH)
2
pLH
   (1 pLL)pLLpLH+
i
< 0:
Hence, the monotonicity of quantities, qwLL() < q
w
LH() < q
w
HH() < q
w
HL(), is ensured.
The monotonicity of consumptions and the fact that (2), (3), (19), (22) are binding ensure
that (1), (4), (21), (23) and (24)are satised strictly. The only work left is to check constraint
(20). From (19) and (22) written with equality we get
2

L   p
2
LH
pLLpLH + 

V (qLL)  2tLL

=

2

L   p
2
LH
pLLpLH + 

V (qHH)  2tHH

+H()
where
H()  (pLH + pHH)
pLH(+ pLLpLH)
[V (qLH)  V (qHH)] + 

1 +
p2LH
pLLpLH + 

[V (qHH)  V (qHL)] :
lim
"0
H()

= lim
"0
(pLH + pHH) [V (qLH)  V (qHH)]
pLH(pLLpLH + )
+ lim
"0


1 +
p2LH
pLLpLH + 

V (qHH)  V (qHL)

=
pLH + pHH
p2LHpLL
h
V (qsbLH(0))  V (qsbHH(0))
i
+
pLL + pLH
pLL
lim
"0
V (qHH)  V (qHL)

(85)
Letting
() 
(1  pLL)

L   p
2
LH
pLLpLH+

  pHHH
2(+ pLH)pLH
() 
H + L   pHHpLH 
2(+ pLH)
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, it can be shown that,
lim
"0
V (qHH)  V (qHL)

= lim
"0

V 0(qHH)
dqHH
d
  V 0(qHL)dqHL
d

= lim
"0
8>><>>:
[V 0(qHL)]2

HpLH
+pLH
0

+ () + 0()

h
HpLH
+pLH
+ ()
i
V 00(qHL)
 
[V 0(qHH)]2

HpLH
+pLH
0

+ () + 0()

h
HpLH
+pLH
+ ()
i
V 00(qHH)
9>>=>>;
=
V 0[qsbHH(0)]
2[(0)  (0)]
HV 00[qsbHH(0)]
=   V
0[qsbHH(0)]c
2HV
00[qsbHH(0)]

2pLHpLL
:
(86)
Inserting expression (86) into (85), we get
lim
"0
H()

=
pLH + pHH
p2LHpLL

V (qsbHL(0))  V (qsbHH(0)) 
c()2V 0(qsbHH(0))
22HV
00(qsbHH(0))

:
It is easy to see that the last term in the square bracket vanishes as H ! +1. Therefore, for
suciently large H , lim"0
H()
 < 0, which implies that (20) holds strictly, i.e., H() > 0 for
weakly negative .
Proof of Proposition 5
For weakly positive correlation, the principal could not fully extract the agents' rents without
violating coalitional incentive constraints (21), (23) and (24).17 As usual, IRL and ICH are surely
binding, and it is obvious that (23) and (24) cannot be simultaneously binding. Therefore, the
set of binding constraints consists of either (2), (3), (21), (23) or (2), (3), (21), (24).
 If (2), (3), (21), (24) are binding, then
E[t(1; 2)] =
X
i2fH;Lg
X
j2fH;Lg
pijtij
=
pLH + pHH
+ pLH
3   pLH
+ pLH
2 +
(1  pLL)
2(+ pLH)
21   pHH
2(+ pLH)
24
(87)
where
26666664
3
2
21
24
37777775 
26666664
LpLLV (qLL) + LpLHV (qLH)
HpLH [V (qLL)  V (qHL)] + HpHH [V (qLH)  V (qHH)]
L   pHHpLH

[V (qLL)  V (qLH)] + H [V (qLL)  V (qHL)]
H [V (qLH) + V (qHL)]  2HV (qHH)
37777775 :
17Remember that FSE mechanism requires tLL; tHL !  1; tLH ; tHH ! +1 as  is positive and goes to zero.
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Substituting it into the principal's objective function and then optimizing with respect to
 2 [0; 1) and qij ; i; j 2 fH;Lg yields  = 1 and
pLH + pHH
+ pLH
L   p
2
LHH
(+ pLH)pLL
+
(1  pLL)
2pLL(pLH + )

L + H   pHH
pLH

V 0(qLL) = c24pLH + pHH
+ pLH
L   pHHH
(+ pLH)
 
(1  pLL)

L   pHHpLH

2(pLH + )pLH
  pHHH
2(+ pLH)pLH
35V 0(qLH) = c
HV
0(qHL) = HV 0(qHH) = c:
It can be veried that qLH < qLL < qHL = qHH . Summing (21) and (24) written with
equalities yields:
[2HV (qHH)  2tHH ] [2HV (qLL)  2tLL] =

H   L + pHH
pLH

[V (qLH)  V (qLL)] < 0;
which contradicts (23).
 If (2), (3), (21), (23) are binding, then
E[t(1; 2)] =
X
i2fH;Lg
X
j2fH;Lg
pijtij
=
pLH + pHH
+ pLH
3   pLH
+ pLH
2   pLH
+ pLH
21   pHH
2(+ pLH)
23
where 26666664
3
2
21
23
37777775 
26666664
LpLLV (qLL) + LpLHV (qLH)
HpLH [V (qLL)  V (qHL)] + HpHH [V (qLH)  V (qHH)]
L   pHHpLH

[V (qLL)  V (qLH)] + H [V (qLL)  V (qHL)]
2H [V (qLL)  V (qHH)]
37777775 :
Substituting it into the principal's objective function (t;q) and then optimizing with
respect to  2 [0; 1) and qij ; i; j 2 fH;Lg yields  = 1 and expressions (29)-(31). The
monotonicity of quantities qwLH() < q
w
LL() < q
w
HL() = q
w
HH() obtains when
H >

LpLH   pHH
+ pLH

+ 
H   pLH

L   pHHpLH + H

  pHHH
(+ pLH)pLL
>

LpLH   pHH
+ pLH

+ 
L   pHHpLH
+ pLH
:
The rst inequality holds for suciently small  > 0; the second inequality holds since

H   pLH

L   pHHpLH + H

  pHHH
(+ pLH)pLL
  
L   pHHpLH
+ pLH
=
(pLH + pLL)(pLH + pHH)
pLH
> 0:
Hence, the monotonicity of quantities is ensured and it implies that the other incentive
constraints (1), (4), (19), (20), (22) and (24) are all strictly satised.
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Proof of Proposition 6
With independent types, pLL = 
2; pLH = (1  ); pHH = (1  )2, then we can nd transfers
tij ; i; j 2 fH;Lg such that ULL  LV (qLL)   tLL = 0; ULH  LV (qLH)   tLH = 0; UHL 
HV (qHL)  tHL = V (qLL); UHH  HV (qHH)  tHH = V (qLH). It is easy to verify that
ICH , IRL are binding and all the coalitional constraints are strictly satised for any  2 [0; 1).
Substituting tij ; i; j 2 fH;Lg into the principal's objective function and then maximizing with
respect to qij yields q
w(0) = qsb(0).
Proof of Corollary 1
 If  > 0 and is close enough to zero, it can be veried easily from (29), (30) and (31)
that qwLL() < q
sb
LL(); q
w
LH() < q
sb
LH(), q
w
HL() = q
sb
HL(); q
w
HH() = q
sb
HH(); if  < 0 and
is close enough to zero, it can be veried from (25)-(28) that qwLL() < q
sb
LL(); q
w
LH() <
qsbLH(). The upward distortions for the quantities of high-type consumers, i.e., q
w
HL() >
qsbHL(); q
w
HH() > q
sb
HH() are ensured by the following two inequalities:
HpLH
+ pLH
+ 
(1  pLL)

L   p
2
LH
pLLpLH+

  pHHH
2(+ pLH)pLH
>
HpLH
+ pLH
+
H
+ pLH
= H
HpLH
+ pLH
+ 
H +

L   pHHpLH

2 (+ pLH)
>
HpLH
+ pLH
+
H
+ pLH
= H :
 If  6= 0, then collusion imposes more constraints on the set of implementable allocations
which must now also be coalitionally incentive compatible, and the seller's payo is thus
strictly lower than the rst-best level: w() < sb() = fb(). If  = 0, then qw() =
qsb() 6= qfb(), the seller's payo is thus w() = sb() < fb(), and (32) holds.
 Letting  goes to zero in (25)-(28) and (29)-(31), we get the continuity of consumptions:
lim
#0
qwij() = lim
"0
qwij() = q
w
ij(0);8i; j 2 fH;Lg. Continuity of the seller's prot (33) can be
obtained accordingly.
Proof of Lemma 1.
Let
f(x) 

L   pHH
pLH

V ('1(x)) + HV ('2(x))  2HV
x
2

g(x)  2

L   p
2
LH
pLLpLH + 

V
x
2

 

L   pHH
pLH

V ('1(x))  HV ('2(x));
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then
f 0(x) =

L   pHH
pLH

V 0('1(x))'01(x) + HV
0('2(x))'02(x)  HV 0
x
2

g0(x) =

L   p
2
LH
pLLpLH + 

V 0
x
2

 

L   pHH
pLH

V 0('1(x))'01(x)  HV 0('2(x))'02(x):
Since
('1(x); '2(x)) = argmax
x1;x2:x1+x2=x

L   pHH
pLH

V (x1) + HV (x2)

;
L   pHHpLH

V 0('1(x)) = HV 0('2(x)) and '01(x) + '02(x) = 1. Therefore,
f 0(x) = HV 0('2(x))  HV 0
x
2

;
g0(x) =

L   p
2
LH
pLLpLH + 

V 0
x
2

 

L   pHH
pLH

V 0('1(x)):
Note that '1(x) <
x
2 < '2(x), hence, f
0(x) < 0; g0(x) < 0 if  is close enough to zero.
 (=)) Summing constraints (14) and (16) yields f(qLH + qHL) > f(2qHH); summing
constraints (11) and (13) yields: g(2qLL) > g(qLH + qHL): Therefore qLL 6 qLH+qHL2 6
qHH .
 ((=) Assume that qLL 6 qLH+qHL2 6 qHH holds. If (14) is binding, then
`16   r16 = [2HV (qHH)  tHH ] 

2HV

qLH + qHL
2

  tHL   tLH

=f(qLH + qHL)  f(2qHH) > 0;
(16) is therefore satised. If (11) holds with equality, then
`13   r13 =

L   pHH
pLH

V
 
'1(qLH + qHL)

+ HV
 
'2(qLH + qHL)
  tLH   tHL
 

L   pHH
pLH

V
 
'1(2qLL)

+ HV
 
'2(2qLL)
  2tLL
=g(2qLL)  g(qLH + qHL) > 0:
It follows that (13) is satised. Summing (13) and (16) yields:
`15   r15 = [2HV (qHH)  2tHH ]  [2HV (qLL)  2tLL]
> f(2qLL)  f(qLH + qHL) > 0;
(15) is thus satised. Summing (11) and (14) written with equalities yields:
`12   r12
=

2

L   p
2
LH
pLLpLH + 

V (qLL)  2tLL

 

p2LH
pLLpLH + 

V (qHH)  2tHH

=g(qLH + qHL)  g(2qHH) > 0;
(12) holds. Analogously, given the monotonicity of quantities, binding constraints (13)
and (16) imply the other coalitional incentive constraints (11), (12), (14) and (15).
39
Proof of Proposition 7
If  < 0, we write the downward individual incentive compatibility constraint (2), the L type's
participation constraint (3), the local upward coalitional constraints (11) and (14) as binding
ones by introducing nonnegative parameters "i; i = 2; 3; 11; 14.26666664
pLL pLH 0 0
pLH pHH  pLH  pHH
2  1  1 0
0 1 1  2
37777775
26666664
tLL
tLH
tHL
tHH
37777775 =
26666664
3   "3
2 + "2
11   "11
14   "14
37777775 ;
where,266664
3
2
11
14
377775 
266664
LpLLV (qLL) + LpLHV (qLH)
HpLH [V (qLL)  V (qHL)] + HpHH [V (qLH)  V (qHH)]
2

L   p
2
LH
pLLpLH+
 
V (qLL)  V ( qLH+qHL2 )

L   pHHpLH

[V ('1(qLH + qHL))  V ('1(2qHH))] + H [V ('2(qLH + qHL))  V ('2(2qHH))]
377775 :
The expected transfer is thus obtained from this invertible equations system
E[t(1; 2)] 
X
i2fH;Lg
X
j2fH;Lg
pijtij
=
pLH + pHH
+ pLH
(3   "3)  pLH
+ pLH
(2 + "2)
  (1  pLL)
2(+ pLH)
(11   "11)  pHH
2(+ pLH)
(14   "14):
(88)
We use for a moment the monotonicity condition qLL <
qHL+qLH
2 < qHH , which will turn
out to be satised at the optimum. To maximize the expected transfer, the seller will set
 = 1; "2 = "3 = "11 = "14 = 0: Optimizing with respect to qij yields (35)-(38). (36) and (37)
imply that the NAC (18) is satised automatically since  = 1.
The only work left is to verify the implementability condition. Since lim
"0
qaij() = q
a
ij(0) =
qsbij (0);8i; j 2 fH;Lg and qsbLL(0) = qsbLH(0) < qsbHL(0) = qsbHH(0); 2qaLL() < qaLH() + qaHL() <
2qaHH() holds when  is suciently close to zero. Since 
a() 6 w() and qa() 6= qw(), we
get a() < w().
Proof of Proposition 8
When  > 0, we write (2), (3), (13) and (16) are binding by introducing nonnegative variables
"2; "3; "13 and "16.
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26666664
pLL pLH 0 0
pLH pHH  pLH  pHH
2  1  1 0
0 1 1  2
37777775
26666664
tLL
tLH
tHL
tHH
37777775 =
26666664
3   "3
2 + "2
13 + "13
16 + "16
37777775 ;
where,266664
3
2
13
16
377775 
266664
LpLLV (qLL) + LpLHV (qLH)
HpLH [V (qLL)  V (qHL)] + HpHH [V (qLH)  V (qHH)]
L   pHHpLH

[V ('1(2qLL))  V ('1(qLH + qHL))] + H [V ('2(2qLL))  V ('2(qLH + qHL))]
2H

V
 
qLH+qHL
2
  V (qHH)
377775 :
Again, the expected transfer is obtained from the binding constraints:
E[t(1; 2)] 
X
i2fH;Lg
X
j2fH;Lg
pijtij
=
pLH + pHH
+ pLH
(3   "3)  pLH
+ pLH
(2 + "2)
  (1  pLL)
2(+ pLH)
(13 + "13)  pHH
2(+ pLH)
(16 + "16):
(89)
Considering the monotonicity condition qLL <
qHL+qLH
2 < qHH , it is optimal to set "3 =
"2 = "13 = "16 = 0 and 
 = 0. Optimizing with respect to qij under the constraint of
NAC written with  = 0 yields expressions (39) to (42).  > 0 is the Lagrangean multiplier
associated with NAC. It can be veried easily that for weakly positive correlation, monotonicity
of consumptions qLL < qLH < qHL < qHH is satised. Hence the implementability condition
qLL 6 qLH+qHL2 6 qHH is ensured. Since a() 6 w() and qa() 6= qw(), the seller's prot is
strictly lower than the arbitrage-free case, i.e., a() < w().
Proof of Proposition 9
When  = 0, let tLj = LV [q
sb
Lj(0)]; tHj = HV [q
sb
Lj(0)]   V [qsbLj(0)]; 8j 2 fH;Lg: It can be
veried that for mechanism (qsb(0); t), (2) and (3) are binding, and all the coalitional incentive
constraints hold strictly for any  2 [0; 1). Since all constraints containing  are slack, any
 2 [0; 1) is indierent to the principal. Hence, she may choose  = 1 to make NAC hold for
qsb(0). The proof is nished.
Proof of Corollary 2
 The case with weakly positive correlation
41
{ (39) implies lims#0 qaLL(s) = q
a
LL(0) = q
sb
LL(0) < q
sb
LL(); 8 > 0. Therefore, qaLL() <
qsbLL() when  is close enough to zero.
{ It follows from (40) that
HV
0[qsbHL()] = c
=

HpLH
+ pLH

V 0 [qaHL()] + 
8<:(1  pLL)HV
0 [qaHL()]  pHHHV 0
h
qaLH()+q
a
HL()
2
i
2(+ pLH)pLH
9=;
+ V
00
[qaHL()]
<

HpLH
+ pLH

V 0 [qaHL()] + 
8<:(1  pLL)HV
0 [qaHL()]  pHHHV 0
h
qaLH()+q
a
HL()
2
i
2(+ pLH)pLH
9=;
<

HpLH
+ pLH

V 0 [qaHL()] + 

(1  pLL)HV 0 [qaHL()]  pHHHV 0 [qaHL()]
2(+ pLH)pLH

=HV
0 [qaHL()] ;
hence, qaHL() < q
sb
HL().
{ Since qaHL() < q
sb
HL() and V
0[qaLH()]=V
0[qaHL()] = V
0[qsbLH()]=V
0[qsbHL()] = H=L,
we have qaLH() < q
sb
LH().
 The case with weakly negative correlation
{ (35) implies
HV
0[qsbHH()] = c =

HpLH
+ pLH

V 0 [qaHH()] +
HV
0 ['2(2qaHH())]
+ pLH
>

HpLH
+ pLH

V 0 [qaHH()] +
HV
0 [qaHH()]
+ pLH
= HV
0 [qaHH()] ;
hence, qaHH() > q
sb
HH();
{ (36) implies that
HV
0[qsbHL()] = c
=

HpLH
+ pLH

V 0 (qaHL()) +

h
(1  pLL)V 0

qaLH ()+q
a
HL()
2

L   p
2
LH
pLLpLH+

  pHHHV 0 (qaHL())
i
2(+ pLH)pLH
>

HpLH
+ pLH

V 0 (qaHL()) +

h
(1  pLL)V 0 (qaLH())

L   pHHpLH

  pHHHV 0 (qaHL())
i
2(+ pLH)pLH
=

HpLH
+ pLH

V 0 (qaHL()) +
 [1  pLL   pHH ] HV 0 (qaHL())
2(+ pLH)pLH
= HV
0 (qaHL())
:
It follows that qaHL() > q
sb
HL();
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{ If  is close enough to zero, it follows from (37) and (38) that
LV
0[qsbLH()] = c =

LpLH   pHH
+ pLH

V 0 (qaLH())
+

h
(1  pLL)V 0

qaLH()+q
a
LH()
2

L   p
2
LH
pLLpLH+

  pHHHV 0 (qaLH())
i
2(+ pLH)pLH
< LV
0[qaLH()]
LV
0[qsbLL()] = c
=
24LpLH   pHH
+ pLH
+
H
(+ pLH) pLL
 
(1  pLL)

L   p
2
LH
pLLpLH+

pLL(+ pLH)
35V 0 (qaLL())
< LV
0 (qaLL())
;
Therefore, qaLL() < q
sb
LL(); q
a
LH() < q
sb
LH().
 The continuity of quantities can be veried directly from expressions (39)-(42)and (35)-
(38).
 The continuity of surplus functions. From (88) and (89), we get
lim
#0
a() =
24pLH + pHH
pLH
3   2   c
X
i2fH;Lg
X
j2fH;Lg
pijqij
35
q=lim
#0
qa()
lim
"0
a() =
24pLH + pHH
pLH
3   2   c
X
i2fH;Lg
X
j2fH;Lg
pijqij
35
q=lim
"0
qa()
a(0) =
24pLH + pHH
pLH
3   2   c
X
i2fH;Lg
X
j2fH;Lg
pijqij
35
q=qa(0)
Since qa(0) = argmax
q2R4+
h
pLH+pHH
pLH
3   2   c
P
i2fH;Lg
P
j2fH;Lg pijqij
i
and lim
#0
qa() 6=
qa(0), lim
"0
qa() = qa(0) , it follows that lim
#0
a() < a(0), lim
"0
a() = a(0). (43)
is thus veried.
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